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Abstract 
This article scrutinizes the assumption that friends support each other in times of war. Picking 
up the notion that solidarity, or ‘other-help’, is a key feature of friendship between states, the 
article explores how states behave when a friend is attacked by an overwhelming enemy. It 
directs attention to the trade-off between solidarity and self-help governments face in such a 
situation and makes the novel argument that the decision about whether and how to support 
the friend is significantly influenced by assessments of the distribution of material 
capabilities and the relationship the state has with the aggressor. This proposition is supported 
empirically in an examination of Sweden’s response to its Nordic friends’ need for help 
during the Second World War – to Finland during the 1939-1940 ‘Winter War’ with the 
Soviet Union, and to Norway following the invasion of Germany from 1940 to 1945. 
Introduction 
‘Friend’ and ‘friendship’ are commonly used terms in the study of international relations, and 
scholars increasingly recognise and examine friendship as a distinct type of relationship in 
world politics. This literature often describes friends as bound together by a collective 
identity based on shared cultural parameters and expressed by cooperative practices. One key 
behavioural feature of friendship is solidarity, broadly understood as standing by someone’s 
side and lending support in times of need. Unsurprisingly, the practice of solidarity comes to 
the fore most clearly during war. As Alexander Wendt (1999: 299; See also, Wolfers, 1962: 
29) puts it, friends “fight as a team if the security of any one is threatened by a third party”.
As intuitive as this sounds, it is a rather sweeping claim that has to be examined more
carefully. Wendt does not do this, and neither does existing IR literature on international 
friendship. Some studies have looked at tensions among friends over military operations in 
far-away places, exploring their ‘verbal fighting’ of international order (Mattern, 2005), their 
ability to overcome crises (Eznack, 2011) and how persistent disagreement over the norms 
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guiding military operations can lead to estrangement (Berenskoetter and Giegerich, 2010). 
Yet, an empirical and conceptual gap exists over how a state behaves when the friend faces 
an overwhelming external aggressor.1 The present article attempts to fill this gap. This is an 
important task, as it probes the fundamental assumption that friends fight as a team. More 
precisely, the scenario forces analysts to confront questions about the factors influencing the 
nature and scope of solidarity, and how extreme situations affect the ability and willingness 
to support the friend. As such, it requires attention to why and how practices of ‘other-help’ 
(Wendt), as expressions of care, may be compromised by egoistic behaviour, or ‘self-help’ 
emphasized by realists.  
      To explore these questions, the article looks at how Sweden reacted when its Nordic 
friends’ were under military attack by a powerful external aggressor during the Second World 
War. Specifically, we focus on the cases of Sweden and Finland during the 1939-1940 
‘Winter War’ with the Soviet Union as the attacker, and of Sweden and Norway during the 
invasion and occupation of the latter by Nazi Germany from 1940 to 1945.2 In both cases, the 
Swedish government decided not to formally side with and officially fight alongside their 
Nordic friends. Exploring the factors underpinning this decision, the article shows, however, 
that the decision was not taken lightly and that Sweden still supported its neighbours in a 
number of ways, even if this support was limited. Thus, rather than reading Swedish 
behaviour as evidence for the non-existence of friendship, we suggest that it reveals the need 
to pay more attention to egoism, or practices of self-help, in international friendship and to 
refine our understanding of the conditions under which friends are willing and able to support 
each other. Specifically, it shows that solidarity is a political choice, and that to understand 
this choice analysts need to consider that governments face a (perceived) trade-off between 
practices of solidarity and of self-help. In this vein, we argue that decisions over the scope 
and nature of solidarity are significantly influenced by ‘rational’ assessments of the 
distribution of material capabilities and how the state relates to the friend’s enemy.  
      Thus, in addition to presenting empirical cases that, to our knowledge, have not been 
discussed in the IR literature, the article advances scholarship on international friendship in 
two ways. First, it shows the benefit of including rationalist actors and realist factors for 
explaining how friends perform in war, presenting a challenge to a literature largely grounded 
in constructivist thinking. Second, it reminds that analysts need to look beyond joint military 
action (‘fighting side by side’) to see different kinds of support across society, and to take 
into account issues of timing. As such, the article reminds that broad and perhaps overly 
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romantic claims about the rules of friendship must be treated with caution and supplemented 
by a more nuanced understanding of both the variations and limits of practices of solidarity. 
      The discussion proceeds in five sections. The first part focuses on the issue of solidarity 
in friendship and outlines the contours of a framework for assessing the trade-off between 
solidarity and self-help among friends. The ensuing three sections explore these issues 
empirically in Swedish-Finnish and Swedish-Norwegian relations. The concluding part pulls 
the insights together and reflects on the implications for the study of friendship in 
international relations and suggests avenues for future research. 
 
Friendship and Solidarity  
The point of departure motivating this article is the view that friendship between states is a 
tangible feature of interstate relations. This is by no means a common position in the field of 
IR, which has traditionally preferred the default assumption of enmity, or rivalry, as the 
natural state of affairs. Yet, over the last two decades scholars have started a serious 
discussion over the ontology of friendship and how it plays out in international relations 
(Berenskoetter, 2007; Koschut and Oelsner, 2014b; Nordin and Smith, 2018; Roshchin, 2017; 
Haugevik, 2018). The relevant argument for our purpose is that friendship is more than, and 
qualitatively different, from an alliance in terms of both ontology and behavioural 
implications. 
      An alliance can broadly be understood as “a formal agreement among independent states 
to cooperate militarily” when facing a shared threat (Leeds and Savun, 2007: 1119). It is an 
instrumental arrangement among rational egoists designed for one particular purpose, namely 
for members to collaborate to fend of that shared threat and to protect their respective, and 
separate, security interests. While alliances can be formed ad-hoc, they tend to be manifested 
in a treaty that spells out the circumstances under which cooperation occurs and the form it 
takes. As such, it is a type of collective security arrangement based on the expectation that 
members will live up to their commitments because it serves their self-interests, not 
necessarily because they trust or care for each other (for a comprehensive discussion, see 
Snyder, 1997).  
      Friendship is different. One distinctive feature of the reading employed here is that it 
entails a form of collective identity, a ‘we-feeling’ that does not presuppose the existence of a 
shared threat. This identity bond is based on interconnectedness expressed in shared 
biographical narratives, values and ideas of order, possibly even languages, and close 
connections between political leaders, government institutions and civil society actors 
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(Feldman, 2012; Koschut and Oelsner, 2014a; Berenskoetter and van Hoef, 2017; Haugevik, 
2018). It renders friendship an “affectively charged” relationship that is valued “higher than 
simply the sum of the material and/or strategic benefits” derived from it (Eznack and 
Koschut, 2014: 73).3 The connections are constituted and maintained through practices, that 
is, specific behaviour friends expect from each other and that maintain the friendship. In 
addition to using the language of friendship or related metaphors, such as family, when 
referring to each other, the most tangible indicator highlighted by IR scholars is that friends 
solve their disagreements peacefully (Adler and Barnett, 1998; Kupchan, 2010; Oelsner, 
2007; Wendt, 1999: 299) and show patterns of routine cooperation during peacetime 
(Haugevik, 2018). Importantly, friends are also expected to support each other during 
conflict. Wendt (1999: 299) calls this the ‘rule of mutual aid’, essentially an open-ended 
commitment to solidarity, broadly understood as standing by someone’s side and lending 
support in times of need. This commitment is unique to friendship. Whereas in a traditional 
alliance members collaborate because they each feel individually threatened, friends care and 
are concerned about one another’s well-being (Koschut and Oelsner, 2014a: 14–15). Thus, 
they support each other and ‘fight as a team’ even if the security of only one of them is 
threatened by a third party. Indeed, Wendt suggests that friends will come to each other’s aid 
irrespective of when the aggression takes place and who the attacker is (Wendt, 1999: 300–
301; see also Wolfers, 1962: 25–34).  
 While the commitment to solidarity marks friendship as a unique relationship, its 
expression is not straightforward. Solidarity can take many forms, and the acts by which the 
‘rule of mutual aid’ is carried out cannot be specified in advance. In contrast to allies 
negotiating particular kinds of support in a limited but clearly defined scenario, solidarity 
among friends is not based on a contract laying out the terms and conditions of its fulfilment. 
Rather, friends trust each other to give what they can in a given circumstance (Berenskoetter, 
2007: 666). Friends may still develop expectations over what they think the appropriate form 
of support should be, however, which raises the possibility that these expectations are not 
met. This possibility is evident once we take into account that friendship is not total. As the 
specialised literature points out, the friend is not simply ‘another Self’ as even close friends 
maintain a degree of separateness (Berenskoetter, 2007: 668). Even Wendt (1999: 306) notes 
that “the pull of egoism” still exists among friends, in particular when speaking of states 
whose very raison d’etre is to favour the needs of their own citizens and provide for their 
own security.  
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 Wendt does not elaborate on this point and, thus, does not consider the potential 
tension the ‘pull of egoism’ generates with his ‘rule of mutual aid’. Yet, once we 
acknowledge that there is a place for self-interest in friendship it is easy to see that, despite 
the feeling of care that propels friends to help each other, solidarity is neither automatic nor 
blind. Rather, solidarity and the specific behavioural form it takes is a choice. Simply put, a 
framework that takes the ‘pull of egoism’ seriously suggests that a government, when faced 
with the choice about whether and how to provide support, will consider the danger it poses 
to its own state. Studies have shown that domestic norms can limit the extent to which a state 
is willing to assist a friend in a military intervention (Berenskoetter and Giegerich, 2010), and 
we might expect even greater constraints when coming to the friend’s aid is likely to have 
serious consequences for the state’s own physical security. Thus, when there is an option to 
remain neutral and avert occupation and destruction, a trade-off emerges between the desire 
to help the friend and the protection of the security and well-being of one’s own state’s 
territory and citizens. Put crudely, in such a scenario governments face the dilemma of having 
to choose between solidarity and self-help.4 
      Once this trade-off is recognised, it is necessary to consider the egoistic factors that 
inform the government’s response to a friend in need and compromise the commitment to 
solidarity. To start with, there is the question of the type of assistance requested and how it is 
provided. If a state is called upon for help it will consider what the friend needs, what it has at 
its disposal, and whether support can be given overtly or covertly. It is easier to provide help 
when the resources requested are readily available. A state will be more hesitant to part with 
resources that are in short supply and/or costly to mobilize. The way support is provided also 
matters. Whereas open and significant aid and especially direct military action are 
particularly risky, the covert supply of non-military material is less likely to aggravate third 
parties and may allow the state to stay out of harm’s way. 
      Taking cues from realist and constructivist reasoning, we argue that the nature and extent 
of aid a state is willing to provide to the friend in need is significantly influenced by two 
factors: the perceived balance of material power and the relationship with the third party. 
Once it is established that a third party is bent on aggression towards the friend, the 
government will, firstly, assess the distribution of military and economic capabilities in this 
constellation. A favourable balance on the side of the friends vis-à-vis the aggressor will 
make the state more confident about the chance of winning or, at least, limits the potential 
repercussions for helping the friend. As such, it makes states more willing to aid their friend 
and do so more extensively. In contrast, a militarily overwhelming aggressor makes it more 
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likely that the state will get severely punished for siding with the friend, putting a high price 
on solidarity and hence make aid less likely and less extensive. Secondly, considerations are 
affected by how the state relates to the external aggressor. Generally speaking, friends can be 
expected to share a cognitive outlook, or at least go along with each other’s perception of 
threat in the sense of ‘my friend’s enemy is my enemy’. Yet, as friends are ontologically 
separate units they may on occasion differ in their perception of the external Other, including 
how they evaluate the threat posed by it and how best to respond to it.5 When their 
assessments of the third party differ, friends are likely to refrain from siding unequivocally 
with each other and may seek a different strategy of engaging the aggressor.  
      Taken together, in a configuration in which A and B consider each other friends and C is 
an aggressor posing a military threat to B, there are two basic scenarios: (i) the worse A’s 
relationship is with C and the more advantageous the distribution of military and economic 
capabilities is considered to be in the favour of A and B, the more likely A is to assist B 
militarily, openly (directly) and extensively. (ii) The better A’s relationship is with C and the 
more disadvantageous the distribution of military and economic capabilities is considered to 
be in favour of A and B, the less likely A is to assist B militarily, openly and extensively. 
Instead, support will be hesitant, covert (indirect) and limited. These two ends of a 
behavioural spectrum are ‘ideal types’ in which self-interested assessment interacts with, and 
is balanced by, the feelings of care for the friend. While the nature and scope of solidarity is a 
matter of political choice on how to handle the trade-off between solidarity and self-help, it is 
important to keep in mind that states are not homogenous actors. Given the high stakes, one 
can expect considerable internal debate and contestation among the political elite, in 
government institutions and in the wider public over whether and how the friend can and 
should be supported. Moreover, wars are dynamic and evolve in unpredictable ways, and so 
we should expect positions and practices to develop, adjusting to new circumstances as they 
emerge.  
 
Empirical Analysis 
The three basic indicators of amity mentioned earlier – stable peace, shared values, and 
interconnectedness – suggest that it is plausible to classify the two dyads under investigation 
as friendships prior to the Second World War. First, both relations were characterised by 
decades of stable peace. Sweden and Finland have not fought against each other or engaged 
in serious hostilities since the latter gained independence from Russia in 1917 (MR Sarkees 
and Wayman, 2010). Even the territorial Åland Islands dispute between Sweden and Finland 
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that would typically instigate war was settled peacefully between the two countries (Archer 
and Joenniemi, 2017: 91–92). Sweden and Norway fought their last (brief) war in 1814 when 
Norway tried to resist ceding its independence to the King of Sweden. There were frictions 
during the last years of the Swedish-Norwegian union, yet it was peacefully dissolved in 
1905. Again, this is remarkable, as these issues were typically settled by the use of force 
(Cooper, 1991). Moreover, Sweden and Norway have not fought wars or engaged in 
militarized interstate disputes since, and a  number of scholars have argued that stable peace 
developed between the two states (Deutsch, 1957: 7, 28; Ericson, 2017; Lindgren, 2015; M 
Sarkees and Wayman, 2010). As is expected of friends, the stable peace between Sweden and 
its Nordic neighbours were also marked by routine cooperation. For instance, Finland and 
Norway were both among Sweden’s most important trading partners in the 1930’s (Veum, 
2017: 79) 
      Parameters of collective identity were present, second, in shared democratic values and 
political systems. According to the widely used Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Gurr, n.d.: 
1800–2014), as well as the more refined V-Dem dataset, all three countries qualified as 
democracies prior to the outbreak of the war.6 According to Jacob Westberg (2012: 92), they 
were ideologically close and sought to collectively protect “Nordic democracy” against anti-
democratic developments in other parts of Europe prior to the outbreak of World War II. A 
sense of collective identity was also manifested, third, in rich cultural and political 
interconnections grown out of intertwined national biographies. Finland and Sweden shared a 
long history and formed a unified political unit for almost 700 years. At the time of World 
War II, Swedish was an official language in Finland and the sole official language of the 
Finnish Åland Islands with a predominantly Swedish population, with some even describing 
Finland’s national identity as 'one nation, two languages' (Anttonen, 2005; Lavery, 2006). 
The fourth largest political party in Finland was ‘The Swedish People's Party of Finland’ 
representing the interests of the Swedish-speaking minority (Lavery, 2006: 96). In Sweden, 
Finland was seen as “a sister state” (Agius, 2006: 78). Norway and Sweden also had 
developed close cultural links, having been united under the same crown for about 200 years 
(Barton, 2003: xii, 78; Ingebritsen, 2006: 7; Tägil, 1995: 3) including a considerable degree 
of mutual intelligibility between their two languages.7 The Swedish term “broderfolk” 
(brother people) was used to emphasize the friendship between Sweden and Norway 
(Hansson, 1945: 90, 227). In both dyads, cross-border social and political integration was 
enhanced by organizations such as the Nordic Workers Congress, Nordic Social Meetings 
and the Nordic Associations, creating a vast and tightknit network of businessmen, lawyers, 
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educationalists, national economists, public servants and members of government 
(Christiansen, 2006: 68–70). Arne Ruth (1984: 53, 69) argues that a Nordic small state 
solidarity existed.  
      Although discussions were held throughout the 1930s regarding the possibility of “some 
sort of Scandinavian defensive alliance,” this idea never materialized (Jesse and Dreyer, 
2016: 115; see also Lindgren, 2015: 260; Roon, 1989). Yet, the absence of a formal alliance 
did not prevent all sides to harbour expectations and express informal assurances of mutual 
support. In fact, William Trotter posits that “Finnish politicians were certain that a defensive 
alliance with Sweden could be arranged on short notice” and that Sweden gave many honest 
informal assurances that they would come to their aid in case the situation worsened (Trotter, 
2008: 15). When Germany broke the peace, the leaders of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and 
Finland convened in Copenhagen in September 1939 and emphasized their neutrality “while 
upholding the right to engage in commerce with one another and the warring nations” 
(Sprague, 2010: 29). The hope was that this would allow these Nordic countries to stay out of 
the war and ensure that they would not end up on opposite sides, while maintaining important 
trade links and economic ties with different parties (Wylie, 2002: 9 n. 4). Nordic heads of 
state and their respective foreign ministers met again in Stockholm in October 1939 to 
discuss their worries and to affirm close ties (Veum, 2017: 14–15). When the war came to 
their doorstep, these affirmations were put to the test, first in Finland and subsequently in 
Norway.  
 
Sweden and Finland: The Winter War 
Following the Soviet invasion of Finland on 30 November 1939, one of the main goals of 
Finnish foreign policy was to gain Swedish aid and ideally get them to join the war on their 
side (Nenye et al., 2015: 188). The Finnish government sent three formal pleas to their 
Swedish counterpart asking for military assistance to fight their common enemy, the Soviet 
Union (Edwards, 2006: 86–87). The pleas not only referred to the shared links between 
Sweden and Finland but also to the fact that Russia had been a traditional enemy of Sweden. 
After all, Sweden regularly fought wars against Russia from the 13th century up to 19th 
century, with Russia annexing Swedish parts of Finland during the Napoleonic Wars. 
However, the Swedish government rejected Finland's pleas for direct military assistance in 
the war. Prime Minister Per-Albin Hansson maintained the line formulated in his speech to 
the nation on September 1, 1939, calling on Swedes to “join together with calm determination 
around the great task of holding our nation out of war” (Reginbogin and Vagts, 2009: 138). 
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He emphasized that Sweden’s foreign policy objectives were purely defensive with the aim 
“to safeguard the existence of our people” (Günther, 1943: 24; Moe, 2011: 147). When 
Finnish Finance Minister Väinö Tanner wrote a letter to Hansson, a fellow Social Democrat 
and personal friend, to clarify the prospects of Swedish assistance, Hansson responded 
promptly to his 'brother' noting that, even though he sympathised with Finland, Sweden 
would not get involved (Tanner, 1950: 48).  
      Hansson tried to divert the blame for this decision by noting that personally he would 
have liked to do a great deal more, but that his hand was tied - “I have to deal with a 
complacent people which wants to be left in peace” (Tanner, 1950: 49). Yet, the matter was 
not as straightforward. The Swedish public was overwhelmingly in favour of Sweden 
intervening in the war on the side of Finland. Large demonstrations were held in support of 
Finland, and senior officials within the Swedish military argued that it would be better to 
defend Sweden on Finnish land (Agrell, 2000; Sprague, 2010: 56–57). There also were 
dissident voices in the Swedish government that advocated for direct military help to Finland. 
In fact, disagreement over how to respond to Soviet aggression, also in the face of a strong 
public demand for supporting Finland, led to a crisis in government (Wylie, 2002: 314), 
which was solved by forming a ‘National Unity’ government. Most notably, the long-serving 
Foreign Minister Rickard Sandler wanted to give the Finnish government some assurances 
and send troops to the Åland Islands, but Hansson and the majority of the Swedish parliament 
rejected this proposal, fearing that such an intervention would drag Sweden into the war. 
Sandler resigned and was replaced by Christian Günther, a career diplomat who supported 
Hansson’s goal of keeping Sweden out of the war (Boberg and Wählbäck, 1966: 13, 22, 31, 
35, 61; Larsson and Marklund, 2012; Reginbogin and Vagts, 2009: 138). 
      The government’s unwillingness to provide direct military assistance to Finland cannot be 
ascribed to a tradition of neutrality, a self-imposed status that had never been absolute (Agius, 
2006; Barton, 2003: 10). Rather, most historians seem to agree that it was motivated by the 
ambition to stay out of the war in the face of an overwhelming military threat. Swedish 
military strength was at a low point in 1939. Following the First World War, Sweden had 
downsized its armed forces, a process that continued well into the 1930's and left Swedish 
military capacity quantitatively and qualitatively far inferior to that of the Red Army 
(Cronenberg, 1982: 36; Edwards, 2006: 113; Eloranta, 2009: 29). Although the government 
had gradually increased the defence budget, on the eve of war, the Swedish military was 
unprepared: strategy, direction, organisation as well as attitude, logistics and equipment of 
the three services – army, navy and air force – were all insufficient for the task ahead 
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(Gilmour, 2011: 210). In fact, the government was motivated not only by the fear of a 
military confrontation with the USSR but also with Germany that had entered into a treaty of 
nonaggression with the Soviet Union shortly before the Winter War broke out (Dijk, 2008: 
596–597; Woodworth, 2012: 228–229). Adolf Hitler reportedly warned Sweden not to take 
sides in the conflict (Sprague, 2010: 163). Taking all this into account, the Swedish 
government concluded that fighting alongside their Finnish friends against the USSR and 
potentially even Nazi Germany would likely be disastrous (Edwards, 2006: 150; Johansson, 
1973: 368). Similarly, the Swedish King Gustav V Adolf, asserted that he could not allow 
Sweden to get pulled into the war by providing official military assistance but maintained that 
it would continue to provide humanitarian and volunteer help to their Finnish friends 
(Sprague, 2010: 161). In short, when weighed against the prospect of a two-front war, Finnish 
requests for direct military assistance were not favoured in Stockholm. Realpolitik and a 
concern with the distribution of material capabilities had taken the upper hand (Gilmour, 
2011: 95; Scott, 2002: 376). 
      Yet, the government’s decision against direct military support did not suppress “the 
friendship and compassion that the Swedes felt for the Finns” or their antipathy towards the 
aggressor (Sprague, 2010: 55).8 As noted earlier, the Swedish public generally showed 
sympathy with Finland and identified with Finnish suffering. Numerous newspapers 
criticized Hansson’s decision and civil society actors launched a range of initiatives in 
support of Finland. Throughout the war, Swedish scholars, authors and other prominent 
figures gave speeches and held well-attended solidarity gatherings throughout the country 
(Sprague, 2010: 62). Volunteers donated food and clothing, and a ‘Committee for Finland’ 
organised the collection of monetary donations. 90,000 Swedes worked on the holiday of 
January 6, 1940 and raised nearly one million Swedish crowns for Finland’s war effort. 
According to Martina Sprague (2010: 62), the total sum of donated items, as well as credits 
and loans given by Swedish banks amounted to 13 billion Swedish crowns, or 1.6 billion U.S. 
dollars.9 The government and civil society organisations sent food, clothing and medicine to 
Finland. Sweden also accepted the majority of the 70,000-80,000 Finnish war children that 
were evacuated across the Nordic countries, many of whom were taken into the homes of 
Swedish families (Kuusisto-Arponen, 2011: 181; Saffle, 2015). 
      Even the government was balancing its decision to prioritize self-help with covert acts of 
solidarity, walking “a diplomatic tightrope when determining if and how it would support 
Finland's cause” (Sprague, 2010: 1). By declaring Sweden 'non-belligerent' rather than 
'neutral' the government indicated that it was open to support Finland in other ways. 
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Militarily, Sweden strengthened its borders by placing approximately 100,000 soldiers at the 
Swedish side of the Torne Valley to relieve Finnish forces in the area and prepare for a 
potential Soviet attack against its own territory (Larsson and Marklund, 2012). Sweden also 
sent military aid in the form of weapons and ammunition across the border. An official 
Finnish announcement after the war noted that Sweden supplied Finland with 90,000 rifles, 
2,000,000 rounds of ammunition, 80 antitank guns, and 250 other cannons, among these 100 
antiaircraft guns. According to this statement, Sweden's most vital contribution to the Finnish 
war effort was its supply of munitions (Tanner, 1950). The government also allowed Finnish 
submarines to be repaired in Sweden on the condition that the crew did not wear uniforms 
(Sprague, 2010: 59). In addition, volunteer soldiers from Sweden began to arrive in Finland 
in January 1940 (Nenye et al., 2015: 192). Initially, Swedish government forbid recruitment 
centres to advertise in newspapers, as it did not want the practice to become public 
knowledge, but eventually gave permission to advertisement on public transport. Yet, the 
volunteers were not allowed to carry their weapons with them. Over the next two months, 
8,260 Swedish volunteers out of 12,705 applicants stood ready to support their neighbour 
(Sprague, 2010: 3), their sentiment expressed in the slogan “Finland’s cause is our cause” 
(Saffle, 2015: 222). While it is not clear how much these volunteers actually contributed to 
the Finnish war effort,10 they symbolised the commitment to solidarity within Swedish civil 
society. Thus, despite the government’s official rejection of Finnish pleas for Swedish troops, 
in the end Sweden was the greatest foreign contributor to the Finnish effort during the Winter 
War (Jowett and Snodgrass, 2006: 21) and played a central role in mediating the peace 
between Finland and the Soviet Union in March 1940 (Wylie, 2002: 314).  
      In sum, both the balance of power and the relationship to the aggressor significantly 
influenced how Sweden dealt with the solidarity/self-help trade-off, as our framework 
suggests. The highly unfavourable distribution of military capabilities was a major reason for 
the government's reluctance to officially join the war on Finland’s side, as this would have 
posed great danger to their own physical security. At the same time, identification with the 
Finnish plight and antipathy towards the Soviet Union generated various forms of informal 
support across government and civil society. 
 
Sweden and Norway: The German Occupation 
German forces invaded Norway (and Denmark) on 9 April 1940. While some in the Swedish 
Press expressed “shock and outrage” the government in Stockholm was not entirely surprised 
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by the invasion (Wylie, 2002: 316).11 The following day, the President of the Norwegian 
Parliament, Carl Joachim Hambro, arrived in Stockholm to ask for help and military support 
on Swedish radio. The Germans found out about Hambro’s plans and told the Swedish 
government to forbid him from doing so or face potential consequences (Veum, 2017: 37–
38). Sweden complied, quickly declared itself neutral and turned down Hambro’s requests. 
By proclaiming itself ‘neutral’ rather than 'non-belligerent', the Swedish government 
signalled that their aid to Norway was going to be far more limited than that provided to 
Finland during the Winter War (Agrell, 2000). Prime Minister Hansson ruled out an 
intervention and informed the Norwegian government that Swedish weapon deliveries to 
Finland had been an exception and that Norway could not expect such help from them. 
      On 12 April 1940, the government prohibited Swedish military personnel to enlist in the 
Norwegian military forces or to participate in acts of war in Norway, nor would Sweden 
supply military equipment or munitions that could be used by Norwegian soldiers. Only food 
supplies provided directly to Norwegian civilians were allowed. The government was not 
willing to risk doing anything that the Germans might interpret as a breach of Swedish 
neutrality (Veum, 2017: 49). That evening, Hansson gave a speech over Swedish radio 
voicing that Sweden felt compassion for their Scandinavian “broderfolk” and was deeply 
shaken by their ordeal. An earlier version of the speech, which described the German attack 
against Norway as ruthless, unprovoked and brutal, was censored by Foreign Minister 
Günther (Veum, 2017: 50). King Gustav V even wrote a personal letter assuring Hitler of 
strict Swedish neutrality. In contrast to the compassionate pro-Finnish attitudes during the 
Winter War, there was little pressure from the Swedish public to take a stronger stance in 
support of Norway. By the time of Norway's surrender in June 1940, the predominant mood 
was that Sweden had to adapt to the situation of being surrounded by the German army 
(Ekman, 2005; Wylie, 2002: 316). 
      The Swedish reluctance to fight on the side of Norway was driven by the objective to 
maintain a ‘separate peace’ (Veum, 2017: 58), and can be understood as a combination of 
three factors. First, again, was an assessment of the distribution of military capabilities. The 
Swedish military was still weak and poorly equipped, and the German invasion occurred right 
after the Winter War, when Sweden had already provided a considerable amount of resources 
to Finland. Moreover, the border against Norway was principally unmanned, and although 
Sweden mobilized its forces these attempts were rather futile. German forces moved into 
Norway with a much swifter pace than the Soviet forces had done in Finland earlier. Even 
Western allies had largely been caught by surprise, and attempts by Britain and France to 
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prevent German occupation of Norway did not succeed. Once Germany was in control of 
Norway, they could have launched an attack against Sweden from every direction and beaten 
its forces with ease (Agrell, 2000). Swedish fears of provoking Germany were well-founded 
as Berlin had prepared plans for invading northern Sweden, should that become necessary 
(Tamelander and Zetterling, 2005: 224). 
      Second, this overlapped with the distribution of economic capabilities. The Swedish 
government was aware of Germany’s need of access to Swedish resources such as iron ore, 
timber products, and ball bearings. Some estimates suggest that Germany imported 50 
percent of its iron ore from Sweden, which was vital for their war effort (Leitz, 2000: 65; 
Sprague, 2010: 153). German occupation of Norway was largely motivated to secure this 
vital resource and to prevent Britain taking control of strategically important Norwegian 
harbours. Encircled by Nazi Germany and with no other major trading partners in sight, 
Sweden became heavily dependent on Germany for trade, which accounted for 70 to 80 per 
cent of all Sweden’s trade from the summer of 1940 until the summer of 1944. Thus, in the 
calculation of a Swedish government determined on maintaining its physical security, 
complying with German demands whilst reaping economic benefits was better than entering 
into a confrontation and prompting the Nazi regime to extract the resources it needed by force 
(Stephenson and Gilmour, 2013). Third, in comparison to the Winter War, Sweden related 
differently to the aggressor. Whereas Russia/the Soviet Union had the role image of an ‘arch 
enemy’, Sweden had long-standing cultural, political, economic and even military ties with 
(pre-Nazi) Germany. As Neville Wylie (2002: 319) notes this created “a situation of some 
normalcy with Nazi Germany”. That is not to say that the Swedish Prime Minister or the 
Swedish population at large regarded the Nazi regime as friends. Hansson had voiced his 
opposition to the Nazis as early as spring 1933 and the vast majority of the Swedish 
population favoured the Allies in the war (Leitz, 2000: 51). Yet, Germany was clearly not 
regarded as threatening as the Soviet Union, as one historian put it “to fight the ‘kulturstat’ 
Germany could…appear unnatural” (Wylie, 2002: 316).12 
      In light of these three factors the Swedish government decided to orient its policy in a 
way that caused “the least possible friction” with Berlin (Scott, 2002: 379; also Agius, 2006: 
81). This stance significantly reduced the scope for solidarity with Norway. In fact, together 
the above factors overwhelmed and effectively neutralized the dilemma between solidarity 
and self-help in favour of the latter, at least for the time being. The government refrained 
from providing Norway with weaponry or support volunteers to join the Norwegian 
resistance campaign. Indeed, it led to the active disarmament and detainment of Norwegian 
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troops that were based in Swedish territory, all in line with the official protocol of strict 
neutrality (Agrell, 2000). When King Haakon VII of Norway, Crown Prince Olav, and the 
members of the Norwegian government requested permission to move freely in Sweden and 
return to Norway when circumstances allowed, the Swedish government refused. A 
Norwegian request to transport ammunition through Swedish territory was also denied 
(Reginbogin and Vagts, 2009: 139). By contrast, Sweden came to assist the German war 
effort. After initially refusing the transfer of German troops and goods through Sweden, the 
government soon permitted German transit traffic, even though it constituted a breach of its 
declared neutrality and was against the wishes of the Norwegian and the British government 
(Leitz, 2000: 52–56; Lorenz-Meyer, 2007: 14). For three years, munitions and a continuous 
stream of uniformed but unarmed German soldiers travelled by rail from southern to northern 
Norway via Swedish provinces (Agrell, 2000; Leitz, 2000: 63; Wangel, 1982: 498). In 
addition, the government eventually let Germany use Swedish airspace and conduct military 
transportations through its waters (with Swedish Navy escort), allowed Germans to use 
Swedish telephone and telegraph lines and to censor anti-German opinion in the Swedish 
press (Agrell, 2000; Scott, 2002: 374 n. 4). 
      The Norwegian reaction to Swedish lack of support and their aid to Germany was 
negative (Ekman, 2005). Norwegians ridiculed Swedish neutrality, and the contact between 
the exile government and the Swedish authorities was sparse and anything but friendly 
(Veum, 2017: 377). The disappointment felt at the time was exemplified in a stinging letter 
that Norway's Prime Minister Johan Nygaardsvold sent from his London exile to his party 
colleague based in Stockholm in December 1940. In the letter he asked his colleague to 
convey his anger to Hansson and tell him that he wanted to see “the Germans get hunted out 
of Norway and…to live long enough to give him and his entire government a proper dressing 
down”, adding that there “is nothing, nothing, nothing I hate with such passion and wild 
abandon as Sweden – and it is his (Hansson's) fault” (The Local Norway, 2012). It was a 
reaction from a friend that feels let down, if not betrayed. 
      Yet, Sweden did show some solidarity with Norway and support grew as the war went on. 
Somewhere between 100 and 300 Swedish volunteers entered Norway to fight on the 
Norwegian side (Agrell, 2000; Gyllenhaal and Westberg, 2008),13 and for many Norwegians, 
Sweden became a safe place. Volunteers helped Norwegian Jews to make their way into 
Sweden, and throughout the war, Swedish authorities accepted roughly 50,000 Norwegian 
refugees and ensured their safety once they had crossed the border (Winkler, 2015: 767). As 
the tides of war began to shift in 1943 and Allied pressure mounted, Sweden stepped up its 
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support. Pro-Norwegian sentiment also grew in the Swedish public with reports of oppressive 
German practices against Norwegian civilians, including death sentences, deportations and 
mass arrests (Ekman, 2005). As a result, the Norwegian government in exile was granted to 
train 'police troops' in Sweden, which included the Norwegian refugees that had sought 
protection in Sweden. These troops received weapons from the Swedish army and by 1945 
over 12,000 men had been trained and equipped with grenade launchers, anti-tank weapons 
and other unusual police equipment (Gilmour, 2011: 103). A small fraction of these troops 
were allowed to operate in Finnmark, as Sweden regarded this area 'liberated’, but the bulk of 
these troops were only deployed in Norway after the German invasion ended to help with the 
reconstruction (Mann, 2012: 183, 208–211). 
      Summing up this case, once again the distribution of military capabilities and, in addition, 
economic interests and the relationship to the aggressor shaped Sweden's approach to the 
solidarity/self-help trade-off. Initially, Sweden prioritised 'self-help' since military and 
economic factors heavily favoured compliance with German demands, facilitated by 
historically closer links with Germany compared to a history of enmity with Russia/the 
USSR. However, as expected by our framework, with the decline of German power, Swedish 
solidarity and support towards their Norwegian neighbours grew. 
 
Conclusion 
This article critically explored the assumption that friends fight together when facing an 
external enemy by pointing to the tension between constructivist solidarity and realist self-
help, a tension largely neglected in the IR literature on friendship. At first sight, the two 
empirical cases seem to show that self-help considerations reign supreme. Despite the strong 
bond Sweden had with both countries prior to the war, the Swedish government did not 
provide Finland and Norway with direct official military assistance when they were attacked 
by external powers. Yet, a closer look revealed a more nuanced picture. The article showed 
that, despite facing an overwhelming enemy, care for the friend did not simply fall by the 
wayside. In the Finland case, calls for solidarity existed even in parts of the Swedish 
government, covert military assistance was provided, and at the level of civil society there 
was compassionate support and a variety of initiatives under the banner 'the Finnish cause is 
ours' (Lagercrantz and Hillebrand, 1939). Although the aid to Norway was more limited, it 
did become more pronounced from 1943 onwards. In both cases, one might also argue that 
Swedish military involvement would have escalated the war in the region and deprived 
Finland and Norway of a safe refuge. So rather than interpreting the official Swedish position 
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as evidence that there had been no friendship between these nations, one must take into 
account that Swedish leadership grappled with the solidarity/self-help trade-off and 
appreciate the practices of solidarity that did occur, even if they fell far short of the ideal. 
      As our framework suggests, concerns about the distribution of material capabilities 
weighed heavily in the Swedish decision how to respond to Finland’s and Norway’s requests 
for help. For the government, entering the war on the side of their friends and, thus, 
confronting Soviet and Nazi Germany was simply too dangerous. The expected costs to 
Sweden’s physical security and material interests were too high. The discussion also showed 
that Sweden’s relationship to the attackers played an important role in determining the ability 
and willingness to provide support. Whereas Sweden and Finland shared a negative view of 
the Soviet Union and considered it a common enemy, Sweden's attitude towards Germany 
was less antagonistic. Long-standing cultural ties and vital trade relations with Germany 
partly explain why, at least initially, the Norwegian cause did not generate the same display 
of solidarity as the Finnish cause and why Swedish aid to Norway was so limited. 
      These insights should prompt scholars of international friendship to be more cautious 
with broad theoretical claims about virtues of loyalty and solidarity associated with 
friendship, and to refine their understanding of how friends act in the context of war. As this 
article has shown, it cannot simply be assumed that friends fight as a team against third 
parties. To understand (variation in) scope and nature of practices of support, the act of 
solidarity must be regarded as a choice, rather than a fixed rule, and the factors influencing 
this choice must be explored carefully. In this regard, scholars of international friendship 
need to better integrate ‘the pull of egoism’, or self-help, into their framework and 
acknowledge that the decision of whether and how to support the friend is made not only on 
the basis of care, but also by assessments of the distribution of material capabilities, as well 
as the relationship the state has to the aggressor. The findings also remind us of the 
importance of context and of paying attention to behaviour at the level of government and 
civil society to capture the range of attitudes and practices of solidarity beyond direct military 
assistance. To further develop the framework presented here and strengthen its analytical 
usefulness it should be applied to other examples of interstate amity in the context of war. 
One aspect that could be more fully explored in this regard is the affective dimension found 
in expressions of care and in emotional reactions to how the solidarity/self-help dilemma is 
dealt with. Regarding the cases at hand, future research may want to assess how Swedish 
behaviour outlined in this article affected the relationships with its Nordic neighbours in the 
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short and in the long term and explore how these historical events are portrayed in their 
respective biographical narratives today.  
  
 
Notes 
1 The reliability of allies and their compliance with formal cooperative agreements in times of 
war has been explored in the rationalist literature on alliances. However, as we argue below, a 
friendship perspective provides a different starting point both in terms of ontology and 
expected behaviour than alliances. 
2 Denmark was also invaded by Nazi Germany during World War II. Compared to Finland 
and Sweden, that case is less useful for the purpose at hand since the Danish government 
surrendered very quickly and did not even have enough time to officially declare war on 
Germany, let alone ask Sweden to fight on their side. 
3 To be sure, friendship is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon and the concept carries a 
variety of meanings, especially when studied in the context of international politics (Smith, 
2019, Smith 2019). For alternative accounts of inter-state friendship not based on identity and 
affect, see Digeser (2016); Smith (2011); Nordin and Smith (2018a, 2018b). 
4 If one considers friendship a source of ontological security and expects that withholding 
support will harm the friendship, one might read this also as a choice between ontological 
security and physical security. 
5 As constructivists have long argued, and some realists acknowledge, experience, 
positionality and ideas influence threat perception: two different states with similar military 
capabilities are not necessarily considered equally threatening; conversely, two actors may 
differ in their assessment of the threat posed by the same external Other (Darwich, 2016; 
Rousseau, 2006; Wendt, 1999).  
6 For the V-Dem data see https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/ 
7 As one scholar put it “Norwegian is Danish spoken in Swedish” (Lanza, 2004: 78). 
8 An exception was the Communist Party in Sweden, which was excluded from the ‘National 
Unity’ government and lost one-third of its members by the end of the Winter War. The 
Swedish communist paper Norrskensflamman was burned down for its support of the Soviet 
Union in the war, killing five people (Sprague, 2010: 55) 
9 That number refers to the value at the time of her writing, in 2009. 
10 Although Swedish and Finnish soldiers were united in purpose, they had never trained 
under common command, and part of the Swedish volunteer force had no previous military 
training or experience of winter operations (Sprague, 2010: 1). 
11 On 8 April, Sweden observed German ships heading north which was in line with the 
intelligence they had received previously from Germans that they were going to attack 
Norway. Sweden forwarded this information to their Norwegian compatriots (Sprague, 2010: 
317; Veum, 2017: 29–31). 
12 The situation was further complicated by the fact that Finland was now fighting alongside 
Germany against the Soviet Union (from 1941-1944), which placed Sweden in a peculiar 
position of having one friend (Norway) occupied by Germany while the other friend 
(Finland) entered into an alliance with the same power. 
13 Approximately 200-300 Swedish volunteers fought for the Waffen-SS (Arielli, 2017: 127). 
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